Skip to content
Discover practical tips for sustainable living, eco-friendl…

MI5's Warning on Beijing's Persistent Spying Attempts in Britain

An unexpected contact on the professional network. An offer of employment from a headhunter, most likely a female agent, operating from the Asian nation. The opportunity to make around £20,000 on the side preparing a small number of political analyses for a Chinese company containing “non-public” or privileged insights. Compensation in digital currency or cash favored.

It may seem clear, on this telling, that an element about this approach would be suspicious. Nevertheless, Beijing's influential intelligence agency still considers it valuable to deploy recruitment consultants to try it – prompting MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their activity online.

Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Professional Networks

Last year, MI5 chief the agency's director stated Chinese agents were approaching Britons on LinkedIn on an unprecedented level, at a rate of 10,000 over the preceding 30-month period, seeking governmental, industrial, military and technological classified information. But a new campaign targeting elected officials and Westminster has prompted the intelligence service to take further action.

An espionage warning was distributed on this week via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his House of Lords equivalent: a single slide after the persistent attempts of certain individuals and Amanda Qiu to contact MPs, peers, their assistants, economic experts, thinktanks – anyone who might provide information.

Intelligence Strategy and Legal Updates

In the curious manner of UK security services, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the Home Office. But the service was aware its briefing note would become public once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Sharing it in the media assists the wider public more easily recognize interactions with a fraudulent purpose.

The alert has the effect of flushing out more information from in and around Westminster, though that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The agency wants people in public life to understand that simply because interactions on professional networks are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.

Nor is domestic spy agency believed to have been responding to a particular event in the legislature, though the burst of activity occur after the embarrassing failure of the prosecution of a former parliamentary aide an individual and his friend Christopher Berry on a technicality earlier in the autumn.

The two had been accused of working for China – a allegation they rejected – but inability to successfully conclude a prosecution under the since replaced Official Secrets Act resulted in concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.

Updated Laws and Beijing's Strategic Goals

The law has since been updated, and the MI5 slide includes a note of its successor: “Individuals involved in spying operations risk substantial legal consequences under the new security law.” This constitutes a crime if somebody participates in conduct that could potentially “significantly help a overseas spy agency”.

A natural question, though, is what China has to gain. A politician who is not a government minister will have restricted knowledge of sensitive information, and an contact of theirs less so. Yet Beijing is also interested in parliament: for a period, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s China policy on issues such as Huawei or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being driven by MPs.

Methodological Differences and Persistent Digital Risks

To a degree there are cultural differences too. Authoritarian governments like Beijing's utilize information gathering techniques and the scale of its spy network is enormous, employing three hundred thousand people. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under the US administration, commented it was sometimes estimated that “China have more English speakers engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.

The Chinese government is willing to cultivate people over the long term and at times even the intelligence services have struggled to distinguish between genuine connections and spying. “Beijing has a minimal requirement for what information is considered to be of value,” the minister responsible a government official told MPs on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the government situation may result in an individual rapidly marginal becomes significant.

An alternative perspective to consider the relentless activities at covert information gathering is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between China and the west at a threshold below the level of direct conflict. The nation has increased its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon infiltration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of millions connected equipment.

Beijing is engaged in relentless attempts to find covert sources on UK politics via digital means because it seeks to be challenging, to demonstrate influence and because it can.

The writer

Ricky Gordon

Environmental writer and sustainability advocate, passionate about zero-waste living and green technology.

Green Works Club

Type to search articles.